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Though, admittedly, the occurrence of such an event is infrequent. Similarly, non-state actors can use regular/conventional tactics if they happen to gather enough strength to execute Mao Tse-Tung's (2005) 3 theory fully. Regular (or conventional) armed forces can resort to guerrilla warfare should the exigencies of war dictate so (Luttwak, 2001, pp. However, to caution the unwary, such modus operandi does not necessarily imply that the actor employing it is a non-state actor. This modus operandi is often ascribed to non-state actors who do not hold the monopoly of the legitimate use of (physical) force ( Kiras, 2009, p.
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Such modus operandi is often preferred by a weaker side and consists of surprise attacks, guerrilla tactics, and terrorism to reach a political objective. Irregular wars 2-in contrast to conventional wars- refer mostly to the modus operandi employed by one or all of the belligerents. The final recommendation is to reframe the debate by paying more attention to the political and strategic domains. Finally, the article will discuss the main short-comings of both approaches from a strategic perspective, concluding that the narrow focus on the operational and tactical levels, mainly, and insufficient attention given to the higher echelons of strategy and policy makes these approaches conceptually flawed and practically useless, thus, rendering the debate inexhaustible and misleading at best. Then, each school will be considered to gain an understanding of the essence of each approach. To this end, before getting to the root of the problem, the article will define the terminology associated with the topic given that irregular war is just one of many terms ascribed to the subject matter. However, the current analytical angle precludes one from recognizing that very fact. This article will contribute to this unresolved debate by examining each school of thought in detail, highlighting their theoretical underpinnings and debunking some of the existing misconceptions on both views to show that the current debate is cyclical if not futile given that both approaches are right and wrong at the same time. However, what approach is best suited to resolve the problem? The second, in contrast, posits that it is the population that should be won over by separating it from the irregular adversary with the use of minimum force that is, as little force as absolutely necessary. In basic terms, the first holds the view that the Gordian knot should be cut, i.e., the enemy should be annihilated.
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XIV).Īs a result of this negative trend, two dominant approaches related to how to counter this issue emerged, being the enemy-centric and the population-centric schools of thought. One of the main reasons for such increased curiosity towards the subject lies in the dismal record that both domestic and expeditionary forces have attained in dealing with this problem (see Paul, Clarke, Grill, 2010, p. Despite the earlier isolated attempts to make sense of irregular wars, it was not until the second half of the 20 th century-in particular, after the end of World War II and sub-sequent decolonization-that irregular wars, and, especially, their subset (insurgency), started receiving serious attention in both academic and military circles. Spanish and French theorists and practitioners, such as Don Bernardino de Mendoza, Santa Cruz de Marcenado, and Paul Hay du Chastelet faced the same problem that besets many countries today ( Heuser 2010, pp. Irregular wars have manifested themselves throughout many centuries, with the 20 th and 21 st centuries being no exception ( Joes, 1996) 1.The first writings on the subject appeared as early as the 16 th and 17 th centuries. PALABRAS CLAVE: Clausewitz COIN contrainsurgencia centrada en el enemigo contrainsurgencia centrada en la población estrategia guerra contemporánea guerra irregular guerras pequeñas Por lo tanto, lo que se debe tener en cuenta es la dimensión estratégica y, lógicamente, la política, al referirse a la contrainsurgencia ya que los dos serán determinantes en el enfoque que se emplee. El argumento central de este artículo es que, si bien ambos enfoques tienen "filosofías" diferentes, son dos caras de la misma moneda. Con este fin, rastrea los significados de cada enfoque desde sus orígenes históricos, discutiendo los fundamentos teóricos para destilar los principios básicos y evaluar hasta qué punto cada uno es adecuado para contrarrestar una insurgencia. Este artículo toma el debate actual entre los enfoques centrados en el enemigo y los centrados en la población como un punto de partida para hacer su contribución, cambiando el enfoque del ámbito operacio-nal y táctico al estratégico.